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SUMMARY 
 
This treatise sets out and evaluates recent developments in the area of large-scale 
retrenchments in South Africa.  Dismissals are considered to be a source of great controversy, 
but more so large scale retrenchments.  It was with this in mind that the various role players 
sought an amendment in 2002 so as to address the concerns by both employers and 
employees. 
 
The applicable legislation, namely section 189A of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, was 
enacted to ensure the smooth operation of this genre of retrenchments.  In this treatise, section 
189A will be evaluated.  
 
Section 189A stipulates what procedure should be utilized, for dismissals necessitated by 
operational requirements.  The inclusion of this provision was an attempt to address the 
concerns of both employers and employees. 
 
Chapter 1 provides us with an overview with regard to why change with regard to 
retrenchment legislation was necessary. 
 
In Chapter 2 the definition of operational requirements will be unpacked as well as what 
definition the courts have attached to the term „operational requirements‟, and more 
importantly the issue relating to substantive fairness. 
 
Chapter 3 examines when the applicable provision is triggered, whether or not an employer 
can stagger retrenchments, the facilitation process, and the regulations pertaining to 
facilitations.  The facilitation process itself and the consultation aspect of the facilitation 
process are recounted.  The meaning of „consultation‟ is evaluated, and it should be noted that 
section 189 and section 189A are interrelated when topics of consultation are considered. 
 
Chapter 4 addresses the instance when no facilitator is appointed and the mechanisms of 
section 189A(7) and (8); further discussions relating to subsection 13, and 19 will furthermore 
be evaluated with reference to case law.  
 
 iii 
Chapter 5 sets out the various viewpoints on whether or not section 189A has been successful, 
and the chapter questions the effectiveness of the provision to provide a realistic view of 
large-scale retrenchments and whether the enactment thereof was an effective mechanism 
protecting the rights of employees faced with possible unemployment. The implementation of 
the training lay off system will be looked at and the statistics of the CCMA will be used as a 
measure to determine the effectiveness of section 189A. 
 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis, by highlighting lessons learnt from case law for both 
employees and employers.  
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Many sectors within the South African economy have been hit by large scale retrenchments, 
which are caused by a host of factors, both internally and externally, and include issues such 
as poor management, poor performance of the South African market globally and global 
competition.
1
  Workforce reduction, technological change, unionization, disinvestments, 
transfers of business, decentralization have become major issues of law and social policy.
2
 
 
Employers are frequently compelled for economic reasons to review staffing levels and 
terminate the employment of some of their employees to effect savings.
3
  The Labour 
Relations Act
4
 saw the adjudication of most retrenchment disputes, much to the dismay of 
organized labour.  The right to strike was severely marginalized; therefore this gave rise to 
dissatisfaction with the level of protection section 189 of the Act afforded employees.  It is 
fair to say that section 189 was aimed at ensuring procedural fairness prior to retrenchment, as 
it was clear that the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court would not second-guess 
management when considering an allegation of substantive unfairness.
5
 
 
It was clear that COSATU was dissatisfied with the position, as it had very little leverage over 
the retrenchment process, as the Act required consultation with the relevant role-players, 
hence Cosatu put forth proposals for the amendment of section 189.  Section 189A was born.  
COSATU wanted change with regard to the consultation process and opted for a more of a 
negotiated approach to retrenchments.  This was because the courts were unwilling to 
intervene in business decisions.  COSATU has stated that many of the retrenchment processes 
were a mere charade in which employers who were advised by lawyers and industrial 
consultants simply went through the processes and never consulted properly.
6
  All this 
dissatisfaction led to the enactment of the current section 189A which regulates retrenchments 
                                                 
1
  Maenetje „Consultation versus Negotiation in Operational Requirement dismissals: the Cosatu Proposal‟ 
(2000) Vol 21(2) ILJ 1526. 
2
  Rycroft and Jordaan Guide to South African Labour Law 2
nd
 ed (1992). 
3
  Grogan Workplace Law 5
th
 ed (2000) 223 
4
  66 of 1995. 
5
  Le Roux „The New Law of Retrenchment‟ Vol 11 (2002) Contemporary Labour Law 101. 
6
  Ibid. 
 2 
in instances where an employer employs more than 50 people and contemplates retrenching 
numbers in accordance with the Act.
7
 
 
Section 189A provides as follows: 
 
„(1) This section applies to employers employing more than 50 employees if – 
 
(a) the employer contemplates dismissing by reason of the employer‟s 
operational requirements, at least – 
 
(i) 10 employees, if the employer employs up to 200 employees; 
 
(ii) 20 employees, if the employer employs more than 200, but not more 
than 300, employees; 
 
(iii) 30 employees, if the employer employs more than 300, but not more 
than 400, employees; 
 
(iv) 40 employees, if the employer employs more than 400, but not more 
than 500, employees; or 
 
(v) 50 employees, if the employer employs more than 500 employees; or 
 
(b) the number of employees that the employer contemplates dismissing together 
with the number of employees that have been dismissed by reason of the 
employer‟s operational requirements in the 12 months prior to the employer 
issuing a notice in terms of section 189(3), is equal to or exceeds the relevant 
number specified in paragraph (a). 
 
(2) In respect of any dismissal covered by this section – 
 
(a) an employer must give notice of termination of employment in accordance 
with the provisions of this section; 
 
(b) despite section 65(1)(c), an employee may participate in a strike and an 
employer may lock out in accordance with the provisions of this section; 
 
(c) the consulting parties may agree to vary the time periods for facilitation or 
consultation. 
 
(3) The Commission must appoint a facilitator in terms of any regulations made under 
subsection (6) to assist the parties engaged in consultations if – 
 
(a) the employer has in its notice in terms of section 189(3) requested facilitation; 
or 
 
(b) consulting parties representing the majority of employees whom the employer 
contemplates dismissing have requested facilitation and have notified the 
Commission within 15 days of the notice. 
 
                                                 
7
  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
 3 
(4) This section does not prevent an agreement to appoint a facilitator in circumstances 
not contemplated in subsection (3). 
 
(5) If a facilitator is appointed in terms of subsection (3) or (4) the facilitation must be 
conducted in terms of any regulations made by the Minister under subsection (6) for 
the conduct of such facilitations. 
 
(6) The Minister, after consulting NEDLAC and the Commission, may make 
regulations relating to – 
 
(a) the time period, and the variation of time periods, for facilitation; 
 
(b) the powers and duties of facilitators; 
 
(c) the circumstances in which the Commission may charge a fee for appointing a 
facilitator and the amount of the fee; and 
 
(d) any other matter necessary for the conduct of facilitations. 
 
(7) If a facilitator is appointed in terms of subsection (3) or (4), and 60 days have 
elapsed from the date on which notice was given in terms of section 189(3) – 
 
(a) the employer may give notice to terminate the contracts of employment in 
accordance with section 37(1) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act; 
and 
 
(b) a registered trade union or the employees who have received notice of 
termination may either – 
 
(i) give notice of a strike in terms of section 64(1)(b) or (d); or 
 
(ii) refer a dispute concerning whether there is a fair reason for the 
dismissal to the Labour Court in terms of section 191(11). 
 
(8) If a facilitator is not appointed – 
 
(a) a party may not refer a dispute to a council or the Commission unless a period 
of 30 days has lapsed from the date on which notice was given in terms of 
section 189 (3); and 
 
(b) once the periods mentioned in section 64(1)(a) have elapsed –  
 
(i) the employer may give notice to terminate the contracts of employment 
in accordance with section 37(1) of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act; and 
 
(ii) a registered trade union or the employees who have received notice of 
termination may –  
 
(aa) give notice of a strike in terms of section 64(1)(b) or (d); or 
 
(bb) refer a dispute concerning whether there is a fair reason for the 
dismissal to the Labour Court in terms of section 191(11). 
 
 4 
(9) Notice of the commencement of a strike may be given if the employer dismisses or 
gives notice of dismissal before the expiry of the periods referred to in subsections 
(7)(a) or (8)(b)(i). 
 
(10) (a) A consulting party may not – 
 
(i) give notice of a strike in terms of this section in respect of a dismissal, 
if it has referred a dispute concerning whether there is a fair reason for 
that dismissal to the Labour Court; 
 
(ii) refer a dispute about whether there is a fair reason for a dismissal to the 
Labour Court, if it has given notice of a strike in terms of this section in 
respect of that dismissal. 
 
(b) If a trade union gives notice of a strike in terms of this section – 
 
(i) no member of that trade union, and no employee to whom a collective 
agreement concluded by that trade union dealing with consultation or 
facilitation in respect of dismissals by reason of the employers‟ 
operational requirements has been extended in terms of section 
23(1)(d), may refer a dispute concerning whether there is a fair reason 
for dismissal to the Labour Court; 
 
(ii) any referral to the Labour Court contemplated by subparagraph (i) that 
has been made, is deemed to be withdrawn. 
 
(11) The following provisions of Chapter IV apply to any strike or lock-out in terms of 
this section: 
 
(a) Section 64(1) and (3)(a) to (d), except that – 
 
(i) section 64(1)(a) does not apply if a facilitator is appointed in terms of 
this section; 
 
(ii) an employer may only lock out in respect of a dispute in which a strike 
notice has been issued; 
 
(b) subsection (2)(a), section 65(1) and (3); 
 
(c) section 66 except that written notice of any proposed secondary strike must be 
given at least 14 days prior to the commencement of the strike; 
 
(d) sections 67, 68, 69 and 76. 
 
(12) (a) During the 14-day period referred to in subsection (11)(c), the director must, 
if requested by an employer who has received notice of any intended 
secondary strike, appoint a commissioner to attempt to resolve any dispute, 
between the employer and the party who gave the notice, through 
conciliation. 
 
(b) A request to appoint a commissioner or the appointment of a commissioner in 
terms of paragraph (a) does not affect the right of employees to strike on the 
expiry of the 14-day period. 
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(13) If an employer does not comply with a fair procedure, a consulting party may 
approach the Labour Court by way of an application for an order – 
 
(a) compelling the employer to comply with a fair procedure; 
 
(b) interdicting or restraining the employer from dismissing an employee prior to 
complying with a fair procedure; 
 
(c) directing the employer to reinstate an employee until it has complied with a 
fair procedure; 
 
(d) make an award of compensation, if an order in terms of paragraphs (a) to (c) 
is not appropriate. 
 
(14) Subject to this section, the Labour Court may make any appropriate order referred 
to in section 158(1)(a). 
 
(15) An award of compensation made to an employee in terms of subsection (14) must 
comply with section 194. 
 
(16) The Labour Court may not make an order in respect of any matter concerning the 
disclosure of information in terms of section 189(4) that has been the subject of an 
arbitration award in terms of section 16. 
 
(17) (a) An application in terms of subsection (13) must be brought not later than 30 
days after the employer has given notice to terminate the employee‟s services 
or, if notice is not given, the date on which the employees are dismissed. 
 
(b) The Labour Court may, on good cause shown condone a failure to comply 
with the time limit mentioned in paragraph (a). 
 
(18) The Labour Court may not adjudicate a dispute about the procedural fairness of a 
dismissal based on the employer‟s operational requirements in any dispute referred 
to it in terms of section 191(5)(b)(ii). 
 
(19) In any dispute referred to the Labour Court in terms of section 191(5)(b)(ii) that 
concerns the dismissal of the number of employees specified in subsection (1), the 
Labour Court must find that the employee was dismissed for a fair reason if –  
 
(a) the dismissal was to give effect to a requirement based on the employer‟s 
economic, technological, structural or similar needs; 
 
(b) the dismissal was operationally justifiable on rational grounds; 
 
(c) there was a proper consideration of alternatives; and 
 
(d) selection criteria were fair and objective. 
 
(20) For the purposes of this section, an “employer” in the public service is the 
executing authority of a national department, provincial administration, provincial 
department or organisational component contemplated in section 7(2) of the Public 
Service Act, 1994 (promulgated by Proclamation No. 103 of 1994).‟ 
 
 6 
The effect of section 189A was to create two regimes governing retrenchments in South 
Africa; section 189 applies to small-scale retrenchments where employers employ less than 50 
people whereas section 189 A applies to large-scale retrenchments and would apply to an 
employer who employs more than 50 employees and who proposes to retrench the numbers as 
stipulated in section 189A(1)(a).
8
  Section 189A and section 189 are interrelated as the Act 
makes reference to the provisions as contained in section 189(3) when issues relating to 
consultation take place.  
 
A distinguishing feature of section 189A is that the process of consultation takes place by 
means of facilitation under the auspices of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration, or the parties may by agreement appoint a facilitator.  Section 189A(3) stipulates 
that the Commission must appoint a facilitator in terms of the regulations promulgated.  If the 
employer has in its notice in terms of section 189(3) requested facilitation or the consulting 
parties, representing the majority of employees, have requested a facilitation and have 
informed the Commission, within 15 days of having received the notice as contemplated in 
terms of section 189(3) then a facilitator would be appointed.  Facilitations in terms of section 
189A are governed by the regulations for facilitations.  This gives parties a guideline in 
relation to how facilitations are conducted under the auspices of the Commission for 
Conciliation and Arbitration.  
 
The second distinguishing feature is the provision relating strike action as a result of the 
employer‟s decision to dismiss as contained in section 189A(7).  Once the relevant time 
periods have elapsed the employees may pursue strike action, or alternatively refer a dispute 
concerning the fairness of the dismissal to the Labour Court for adjudication. In Continental 
Tyre SA Pty Ltd v Numsa Davis JA remarked as follows: 
 
„The purpose of the new section was to allow employees the right to strike over certain 
dismissals based on operational requirements and held that it was not possible in the 
proceedings to conclude that the employer had intimated that it was obliged to do, a 
section 189 process with regard to certain departments when it already contemplated 
retrenchments within the meaning of section 189A.‟ 
 
                                                 
8
  Le Roux „The New Law of Retrenchment‟ 102. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Before the introduction of section 189A of the LRA in 2002, there was no statutory definition 
of substantive fairness in the case of operational requirements dismissal, according to the 
courts, the question whether or not an employee‟s dismissal for operational reasons is 
substantively fair is a factual one and the employer will have to prove a number of things in 
this regard.
9
 
 
Operational requirements in terms of section 213 of the Labour Relations Act
10
 are defined as 
„requirements based on the economic, technological, structural or similar needs of the 
employer‟.  The code of good practice further elaborates as follows: 
 
„As a general rule, economic reasons are those that relate to the financial management of 
the enterprise.  Technological reasons refer to the introduction of new technology that 
affects work relationships either by making existing jobs redundant or by requiring 
employees to adapt to the new technology or a consequential restructuring of the 
workplace.  Structural reasons relate to the redundancy of posts consequent to a 
restructuring of the employer‟s enterprise.‟ 
 
Seemingly the Labour Relations Act restricts this ground to economic, structural or 
technological needs and would thus equate to similar needs of an employer, therefore a male 
employee cannot be dismissed on operational grounds in order to promote gender diversity in 
the workplace.
11
 
 
In dismissals for operational requirements, the employer must firstly prove that the reason 
proffered is one based on the operational requirements of the business and that the reason fell 
within the statutory definition of operational requirements.
12
  Obligations are placed on the 
employer to establish that the dismissal is substantively and procedurally fair.  In Keil v 
                                                 
9
  Basson, Christianson, Garbers, Le Roux, Mishke, Strydom Essential Labour Law 4
th
 ed (2005) 151. 
10
  66 of 1995. 
11
  Du Toit, Bosch, Woolfey, Godfrey, Rossouw, Christie, Cooper, Giles and Bosch Labour Relations Law: 
A Comprehensive Guide 5
th
 ed (2003) 405. 
12
  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 151. 
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Foodgro,
13
 Mlambo held that „it is through constructive engagement implicit in the process 
that the need to retrench is confirmed as well as the selection of those employees who are to 
be retrenched‟.14 
 
In Henry v Adcock Ingram
15
 the Labour court made the following comment: 
 
„If an employer can show that a good profit is to be made in accordance with sound 
economic rationale and it follows that fair process to retrench an employee as a result 
thereof it is entitled to retrench.  When judging and evaluating an employer‟s decision to 
retrench an employee this court must be cautious not to interfere in the legitimate business 
decisions taken by employers who are entitled to make a profit and who, in so doing, are 
entitled to restructure their business.‟ 
 
The Labour Appeal Court in Fry’s Metal (Pty) v National Union of Metalworkers of SA & 
Others
16
 held that the LRA only makes reference to operational requirements and does not 
distinguish between operational requirements in the context where the business is fighting for 
survival and operational requirements in the case of a profitable business wanting to make 
even more profit. 
 
Section 189A(19) is peremptory and sets out which factors a court should take into account 
when coming to a decision whether the dismissal was based on fair reasons.  Section 
189A(19) of the Act
17
 stipulates the following:  
 
„In any dispute referred to the Labour Court in terms of section 191(5)(b)(ii) that 
concerns the dismissal of the number of employees specified in subsection (1), the Labour 
Court must find that the employee was dismissed for a fair reason if – 
 
(a) the dismissal was to give effect to a requirement based on the employer‟s 
economic, technological, structural or similar needs; 
 
(b) the dismissal was operationally justifiable on rational grounds; 
 
(c) there was a proper consideration of alternatives; and 
 
(d) selection criteria were fair and objective.‟ 
 
 
                                                 
13
  [1999] 4 BLLR 345 (LC). 
14
  Keil v Foodgro supra. 
15
  (1998) 19 ILJ 85 (LC). 
16
   (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC). 
17
  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
 9 
Section 189A(10) establishes a norm which the courts are bound to apply generally in testing 
the fairness of the reason for an operational requirement dismissal.  This, in conjunction with 
the jurisprudence that has developed as to date, remains the authority with regard to the issue 
of fairness. 
 
2.2 THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 
 
The courts have been hesitant to interfere with the business rationale for retrenching 
employees.  It is with this in mind that we have to consider an array of case law to determine 
exactly what is meant by substantive fairness in the context of retrenching employees. 
 
Section 189 and section 189A are designed to ensure that retrenchment is not resorted to 
when other alternatives exist and when it can be avoided.  Courts were wary of declaring 
retrenchments unfair solely because the employer could objectively have afforded all or some 
of the retrenched employees; all that has been generally been required is an economic 
rationale which must have been aimed at effecting savings.
18
 
 
Early decisions considered bona fide and non-discriminatory decisions by the employer to be 
sufficient; and once that has been established, no further reasons for the decisions would be 
required.
19
 
 
In NUMSA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd
20
 the Labour Appeal court held that 
 
„fairness in this context goes further than bona fide and commercial justification for the 
decision to retrench.  It is concerned, first and foremost, with the question whether the 
termination of employment is the only reasonable option in the circumstances.  It has 
become trite for the courts to state that termination of employment for disciplinary and 
performance related reasons should always be a measure of last resort.  That in our view, 
applies equally to termination of employment for economic reasons‟. 
 
In NEHAWU v The Agricultural Research Council
21
 the court held that its function is 
 
„not merely to determine whether the requirements for proper consultation process have 
been followed and whether the decision to retrench was commercially justifiable but 
                                                 
18
  Grogan Workplace Law (2005) 221. 
19
  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 5
th
 ed (2003) 425 
20
  (1993) 14 ILJ 642 (LAC). 
21
  [2000] 8 BLLR 1081 (LC). 
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whether the retrenchment is properly and genuinely justified by operational requirements 
in the sense that it was a reasonable option in the circumstances‟. 
 
In SACTWU v Discreto (a division of Trump and Springbok Holdings),
22
 regarding fairness to 
the employer, Froneman held that it is expressed by the recognition of the employer‟s 
ultimate competence to make a final decision on whether to retrench or not.  For the employee 
fairness is found in the requirement of consultation prior to the final decision to retrench.  
This requirement has a substantive purpose.  That purpose is to ensure that the decision to 
retrench is properly and genuinely justifiable by operational requirements, or put differently, 
by commercial or business rationale. 
 
In BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v SACTWU
23
 Davis AJA found that the test for substantive 
fairness as enunciated in SACTWU v Discreto, Davis AJA, who suggested the following 
approach: 
 
„The word fair introduces a comparator.  The starting point is whether there is a 
commercial rational for the decision.  But rather than take such justification at face value, 
a court is entitled to examine whether the particular decision has been taken in the 
manner which is also fair to the employees to be retrenched.  To this extent the court is 
entitled to enquire as to whether a reasonable basis on which the decision is predicated.  
Viewed accordingly, the test becomes less deferential and the court is entitled to examine 
the content of the reasons given by the employer, albeit that the enquiry is not directed to 
whether the reason offered is one which could have been taken by the court.  Fairness not 
correctness is the mandated test.‟ 
 
Similarly it was held in NEHAWU v The Agricultural Research Council
24
 that 
 
„the purpose  was not merely to determine whether the requirements for proper 
consultation process has been followed and whether the decision to retrench was 
commercially justifiable but whether the retrenchment is properly and genuinely justified 
by operational requirements in the sense that it was a reasonable option in the 
circumstances‟. 
 
In SACWU v Afrox Ltd
25
 it was held by the court that 
 
„it could no longer be said that the court‟s function in scrutinizing the consultation 
process in dismissals for operational requirements is merely to determine the good faith 
                                                 
22
  [1998] 12 BLLR 228 (LAC).  
23
  (2001) 22 ILJ 2264 (LAC). 
24
  [2000] 9 BLLR 1081 (LC). 
25
  [1999] 10 BLLR 1005 (LAC).  
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of the employer … the matter is now one of proof by the employer on a balance of 
probability of the 
 
(a) the cause or the reason for the dismissal; 
 
(b) the defined operational requirements that the dismissal was based on; 
 
(c) a fair procedure in accordance with section 189; 
 
(d) the facts upon which a finding of substantively fair reason for the dismissal can be 
made.‟ 
 
From the above extracts is it clear that substantive fairness can only be established if enquiry 
into the reasons of the dismissal is held, and that in this instance it is done through a process 
of consultation.  This has, however, been clarified in SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox 
Ltd
26
 in that the enquiry is not only whether the employee acted in good faith, but it goes 
further that the employer now has to prove on a balance of probability that the cause or the 
reason for the dismissal was based on operational requirements as defined by the Act,
27
 that a 
fair procedure has been followed in accordance with the provisions of section 189; and the 
facts upon which a finding that there had been a substantively fair reason for the dismissal.
28
 
 
It must, however, be highlighted that even though the provisions enacted, section 189 and 
section 189A „gives colour and content to the issue of fairness in retrenchment, its 
significance should not be underestimated, but that the Act provides a guide and cannot be 
treated as a set of rules that conclusively disposes of the issue of fairness‟.29  One cannot use 
retrenchments to dismiss employees who would otherwise have been dismissed for an issue 
such as poor work performance.  The reason for the dismissal has to be based on the 
operational requirements.  This was evident in the matter of NEHAWU v Medicor (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Vergelegen Medi Clinic,
30
 where the court held that in this instance, the reason for the 
applicants‟ dismissal was their perceived poor work performance. 
 
In NUMSA v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd31 the court held that the dismissal of the applicants after 
they refused to agree to the change to the terms and conditions of service did not amount to an 
automatically unfair dismissal and that an employer is justified by operational requirements to 
                                                 
26
  (1999) 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC). 
27
  S 213 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
28
  Grogan Workplace Law 223. 
29
  Ibid.  
30
  [2005] 1 BLLR 10 (LC). 
31
  [2005] 5 BLLR 430 (SCA). 
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dismiss.  The Supreme Court of Appeal approved the reasoning of the Labour Appeal Court
32
 
and held that  
 
„for reasons set out fully in the LAC decision, it seems clear to us that the particular 
legislative history of the concept dismissals are designed to induce agreement to an 
employer‟s demand illuminates the distinctive nature of the protection accorded to those 
dismissals that are truly designed to make employees change their minds in a dispute with 
an employer on matters of mutual interest.  Only they are prohibited as automatically 
unfair‟. 
 
An employer can thus show that business imperatives justify a change to work practices is 
entitled to insist that workers accept change or face the real possibility of being dismissed 
because of operational requirements, it still, however, remains for the employer to establish 
that the dismissal was justified in the circumstances.
33
 
 
In Swanepoel and Others v Fidelity Corporate Services (Pty) Ltd
34
 three applicants had been 
employed as investigators by Fidelity Corporate Services, but were retrenched when the 
Fidelity Group decided that each of its three principal subsidiaries, Fidelity Cash Management 
Services, Fidelity Springbok Security Services and Fidelity Supercare Cleaning Services 
needed to operate more independently so as to attract more black economic Empowerment 
interest.  This resulted in the loss of the 18 investigators positions.  Thirteen of these found 
fresh employment with Fidelity Cash Management, but the applicants did not.  They argued 
that there dismissals had not been effected for a fair reason and that the restructure was a 
sham.  The court however noted that the restructure was no sham and had been undertaken for 
justifiable business reasons to leverage the business opportunies that existed at the time and 
therefore the dismissal was found to be substantively fair. 
 
In Ngozo and Others v Scorpion Legal Protection
35
 the applicants ended up in a squabble 
with their employers in regard to restructuring initiative and pay grievances.  The pay 
grievance went on to be decided at the CCMA during the restructuring process whereby the 
parties were trying to attempt to consult on restructuring.  Various meetings were held during 
January 2006 and February 2006, where by the parties tried to reach a consensus.  In early 
February the company terminated their services based on operational requirements.  They 
                                                 
32
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33
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34
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alleged that their dismissals were unfair and constituted an automatically unfair dismissal in 
terms of section 187 of the Act.  The applicants faced the burden of proof in this instance.  
The court however concluded that if the company wanted to dismiss them they would have 
done so soon after they had lodged their case and would not have waited four months before 
taking action against the applicants.  The court was satisfied that the employer had a genuine 
need to restructure and has indeed become redundant in consequence. 
 
In Numsa and others v Genlux Lighting (Pty) Ltd,
36
 the employer employed approximately 70 
employees and was faced with a number of operational issues, namely absenteeism, 
productivity, theft, competition from cheap imports and volatile rand dollar exchange rates.  
 
Numsa was part of the consultation process and discussions with regard to remedial measures 
took place.  The union made proposals and following measures were tabled: 
 
(a) improving the ordering system; 
(b) improving communication between workers and staff; 
(c) addressing the lack of respect between staff and the workers; 
(d) tackling absenteeism; and 
(e) upgrading the machines. 
 
In September 2005, the employer rejected all proposals and embarked on consultation process 
with Numsa.  The process emanated in no favourable decisions and the employer decided to 
outsource all its production process and engage the services of a temporary employment 
agent.  The whole workforce was retrenched on 16 November 2009, paying the employees‟ 
severance pay in the process. 
 
The matter was referred to the Labour Court after conciliation had failed.  The court had to 
decide whether the dismissals were substantively fair.  Cele AJ concluded that: 
 
„the reasons advanced for the retrenchment when seen against the behavior of the 
Respondent after retrenchment show that the decision to retrench was nothing but a sham.  
The evidence showed that the retrenchment was not properly justified by its operational 
requirements.  The decision to retrench was not properly and genuinely justified by 
operational requirements.  The decision to retrench was not a reasonable option in the 
circumstances‟. 
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The court furthermore made the following order that the respondent was to re-employ each of 
the 40 applicants in respect of whom re-employment is still practicable.  
 
It is evident that even though employers may try to simply comply with the provisions of the 
Act, this does not mean that the court will not look at the real reason for retrenchment.  
Retrenchment needs to be justified by its operational requirements in the sense that it was a 
reasonable option in the circumstances. 
 
Consultation is furthermore a key element in dismissing for operational requirements and the 
employer must not present the employee with a fait accompli.  In Visser v Atronic 
International GmbH, Basson AC stated that:  
 
„the applicant in this matter was afforded no opportunity to influence the actual decision 
to retrench her.  She was not afforded the opportunity to consult over the need to retrench 
her.  What makes matters worse for the respondent is the fact that Kruger a local labour 
lawyer conceded that he did not advise the respondent‟s head office that in terms of South 
African law, an employer may not confront an employee with a fait a compli‟. 
 
The court concluded that the dismissal of the employee was substantively unfair and the 
employee was awarded 12 months salary, plus her costs. 
 
In Janse Van Rensburg v Super Group Trading (Pty) Ltd
37
 the individual applicant in this 
instance was a senior manager running the warehouse and the management of employees 
working there.  In this instance the employer pre-determined the issues before the consultation 
process began.  The workplace was furthermore not unionized and prior to the consultation 
process it was decided that the applicant would be dismissed for operational requirements.  
The court was not satisfied with the manner in which the applicant had been dealt with and 
expressed the following: 
 
„He was never given an opportunity to respond to the allegations before the decision to 
terminate his employment was taken. In any case, these are issues which are best dealt 
with through a disciplinary or incapacity hearing and not the retrenchment process.‟  
 
The dismissal was held to be both substantively and procedurally unfair and the applicant was 
awarded 12 months‟ compensation.  It is evident from the array of case law that the reason for 
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the dismissal based on operational requirements need to be valid and in accordance with the 
definition attached to the terms operational requirements.  In Tiger Food Brands Ltd t/a 
Albany Bakeries v Levy NO,
38
 the Labour Court held that: 
 
„the definition of operational requirements should not be narrowly construed, that the 
phrase “similar needs” should include needs that have some “resemblance of economic, 
technological or structural requirements”.  And that managements‟ inability to manage the 
business affected its economic viability‟. 
 
What makes the provisions of section 189A unique is that when the consulting party, 
presumably the trade union or employee, is dissatisfied with the substantive fairness of a 
dispute, then the parties have recourse either to refer the matter to the Labour Court for 
adjudication or embark on strike action so as to use power play to coerce the employer to 
meet their demands.  It was clearly the intention of the legislature to limit the right to strike to 
a situation where the union or employees are of the opinion that the reason for the dismissal 
was not fair.  
                                                 
38
  (2007) 28 ILJ 1827 (LC). 
 16 
CHAPTER 3 
WHEN IS SECTION 189A TRIGGERED? 
 
3.1 SECTION 189A(1) 
 
Section 189A(1) provides that this section applies to employers employing more than 50 
employees if – 
 
„(a) the employer contemplates dismissing by reason of the employer‟s operational 
requirements, at least – 
 
(i) 10 employees, if the employer employs up to 200 employees; 
 
(ii) 20 employees, if the employer employs more than 200, but not more than 
300, employees; 
 
(iii) 30 employees, if the employer employs more than 300, but not more than 
400, employees; 
 
(iv) 40 employees, if the employer employs more than 400, but not more than 
500, employees; or 
 
(v) 50 employees, if the employer employs more than 500 employees.‟ 
 
Section 189A(1)(b) furthermore states that if the employer has contemplated dismissing 
employees, together with the number of employees that the employer previously dismissed 
for operational requirements in the last 12 months equals or exceeds the numbers as stipulated 
in section 189A(10)(a) this particular section is applicable to the second retrenchment.  This 
provision was enacted to ensure that employers do not circumvent the provisions of section 
189A and stagger or split retrenchments.
39
 
 
The question whether section 189A is applicable in instances where the employer wishes to 
retrench again after the first retrenchment has been done in terms of section 189 due to the 
numbers falling short of section 189A, was addressed in the Labour Appeal Court decision, in 
the matter, Continental Tyre South Africa (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA.
40
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The facts of the matter were briefly as follows: In 2004-2005 Continental Tyre wanted to 
counteract adverse market conditions by introducing changes to shift arrangements.  This was 
resisted by the union NUMSA.  The employer then decided to retrench certain employees 
who worked in the steel truck department.  A notice was issued in terms of section 189(3), 
proposing consultations, for a number of retrenchments and what could be done to avoid 
them.  Business conditions continued to worsen and therefore the first notice issued was 
withdrawn and reissued on 26 May 2005 and accompanied by another notice relating to 
employees in cross ply department.  
 
The parties consulted, but by June 2005 the employer realised that more than 50 employees, 
were now being affected and the provisions of section 189A now had to be evoked. In a letter 
to the company‟s lawyers indicated that a twin track application of the law would have to 
apply.  On the one hand the employer indicated that it exhausted the section 189 process, 
whereby employees of cross ply and steel truck departments would have to be retrenched, but 
due to lower levels of productivity, retrenchments in terms of section 189A would have to be 
embarked upon.  In July 2005, the company issued section 189A notices and the union 
brought an application interdicting the employer from proceeding further with the 
retrenchment exercise on the basis that section 189A regulated the process and not section 
189A.  Ngcamu AJ found for the union. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court differed and came to the opposite conclusion and the following is 
apparent from the judgment: 
 
(a) The employer is entitled to do some provisional pondering over restructuring and 
possible retrenchments before being obliged to consult with affected parties. 
 
(b) On the papers it was found that the union did not dispute the need for downsizing by 
reason of the operational requirements of the business. 
 
(c) As a result the union had no case to interdict the company. 
 
(d) The employer was entitled to commence consultations under section 189 when it did.  
At that time, it had not contemplated dismissal which triggered section 189A.  The 
section 189 process had to run its course before section 189A was invoked.  The court 
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held that the matter revolved around the meaning of contemplates as used in section 
189A(1) and whether section 189A superseded section 189 in the case where an 
employer issues a section 189A notice immediately after the completion of the 
consultation process in terms of section 189. 
 
In this case if the employer really did not contemplate retrenchments on a section 189A scale 
at first, but they later took on those proportions, then it still looks very arguable that the whole 
escalated situation would have been subject to section 189A.
41
  In the letter dated 7 June 
2005, section 189 dismissals had not been effected but dismissals in terms of section 189A 
were being contemplated.  Both sets of retrenchments were put in action by the same 
economic circumstances. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court‟s interpretation of section 189 is contrary to the wording of the 
section which stipulates that consultation commence when the employer contemplates 
dismissing employees. 
 
The interpretation adopted by Ngcamu AJ, in the Labour Court decision
42
 may have been 
closer to the legislatives interpretation attached to section 189.
43
  The aforementioned court 
did not approve of the twin tracked approach and commented as follows: 
 
„In the circumstances where the need to retrench arises at different periods of time whiles 
the consultation process is in progress a need arises to retrench more employees bringing 
the number of employees to be retrenched within the ambit of section 189A, the process 
under section 189A supercedes the process under section 189.  It follows that the process 
under section 189 should be stopped and the process under section 189A takes over.  To 
allow different processes would be to undermine the provisions of section 189A which 
was designed to enable employees to act collectively when faced with a mass dismissal.‟ 
 
Nevertheless, the decision of the LAC stands as supreme law and is therefore applicable. 
 
Section 189(2) states that an employer must give notice of termination of employment in 
accordance with these provisions and that an employee may embark on strike action while an 
employer may lock out an employee in accordance with the provision of this section.  
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Consulting parties may furthermore agree to vary the time period in which to have the 
facilitation or consultation. 
 
3.2 WHO MAY APPLY FOR FACILITATION? (SECTION 189A(3)) 
 
Section 189A subsection (3) states that the Commission must appoint a facilitator in terms of 
any regulations made under subsection (6) to assist the parties engaged in consultation if the 
employer has requested facilitation in terms of his notice or the consulting parties 
representing the majority of the workforce whom the employer contemplates dismissing have 
requested facilitation and have notified the Commission within 15 days of the notice. 
 
Facilitation is one of the most notable features of section 189A, to which only employers and 
those who represent the majority of employees whom the employer contemplates dismissing.  
This was highlighted in RAWUSA v Schuurman Metal Pressing (Pty) Ltd,
44
 where the court 
concluded as follows: „The right to seek facilitation is conferred only on unions representing 
“the majority of employees whom the employer contemplates dismissing”.‟  The applicant 
represented 32 out of the 78 employees targeted for the dismissal.  Consequently it could 
claim no entitlement to facilitation and the time period stipulated in section 189A(3)(b) was of 
no application in that case. 
 
In National Union of Mineworkers and Others v Geffens Diamond Cutting Works (Pty) Ltd
45
 
the court concluded that the respondent was not obliged in terms of the law to consult with 
NUM and/or individual applicants.  The court furthermore made the following conclusions: 
 
(a) That the individual applicants were members of UASA. 
 
(b) UASA acted on behalf of its members in terms of a mandate. 
 
(c) An agreement was reached between the respondent, UASA, and all aspects of 
retrenchment and that a correct and fair procedure. 
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(d) The retrenchments of the individuals were executed in terms of the said agreement with 
UASA. 
 
(e) Num and the individual applicants did not challenge UASA on the agreement between 
the respondent and UASA. 
 
The court furthermore concluded that the reason for the retrenchment was due to the lack of 
supply of small diamonds and the ultimate closure of the small diamond department.  The 
court concluded that the retrenchment was substantively and procedurally fair.  The 
applicants‟ case was dismissed with costs. 
 
Section 189A(4), however, states that the parties may agree to appoint a facilitator in 
circumstances other than that as contemplated in section 189A(3).  This approach was 
furthermore endorsed in the case supra. 
 
3.3  THE FACILITATION PROCESS 
 
Facilitations must be conducted in terms of Regulations
46
 made by the Minister of Labour for 
the conduct of such facilitations.  In terms of these regulations the party requesting facilitation 
must do so by completing a LRA 7.20 form and serving it on the commission and relevant 
parties in terms of the CCMA rules. 
 
According to regulation 2 of the Facilitation Regulations,
47
 the CCMA should within 7 days 
of receiving notice, notify the parties of the facilitator and after consulting the parties, the date 
of the first facilitation meeting.  The parties may agree to appoint a facilitator other than the 
one appointed in the notification, however the CCMA is not liable for the fees of such a 
facilitator. 
 
Regulation 3 regulates the conduct of the first meeting and the facilitator must assist the 
parties to reach consensus on the procedure to be followed.  The date and time of additional 
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meetings and the information the employer is to be disclosed in terms of section 189(3)(a) of 
the Act
48
 and when the information should be disclosed. 
 
The powers and duties of the facilitator are regulated by regulation 4 of the afore-mentioned 
regulations,
49
 which stipulate that a facilitator may:  
 
„(a) chair the meeting between parties; 
 
(b)  decide any issue of procedure that arises during the course of the meetings between 
parties; 
 
(c)  arrange further facilitation meetings, after consultation with the parties; 
 
(d)  direct the parties to engage in consultations without the facilitator.‟ 
 
Sub-section 2 of the same regulation stipulates that a decision in respect of any matter 
concerning the procedure for conducting the facilitation, including the date and time of 
meetings are final and binding.  The parties may by agreement perform any other function. 
 
Regulation 5 governs the power to order disclosure of information.  In doing so the facilitator 
may hear representations from both parties and make an order directing an employer to 
produce documents that are relevant to the facilitation.  Section 189(4)(b) and section 16(5) 
and (10) to (14) of the Act, read with the changes required by the context, apply to any 
dispute, concerning the disclosure of information. 
 
Regulation 6 dictates that four facilitation meetings should be held, and unless the dispute is 
settled in fewer, the parties can furthermore in any case agree to fewer meetings.  If no 
settlement is reached the Director of the CCMA, after consultation with the facilitator, may 
increase the number of meetings.  Meetings specified do not include meetings convened for 
the purpose of arbitrating a dispute relating to the disclosure of information. 
 
Regulation 7 stipulates that the status of facilitation meetings are with prejudice, however, the 
parties may agree that a part of them may be held on without-prejudice basis, and that that 
part may not be disclosed in any court proceedings.  Facilitators may not be called to give 
evidence with regard to any part of the facilitation meetings.  By stating that the facilitation is 
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with prejudice means that any offers or statements made during the course of facilitation can 
be referred in evidence in subsequent court proceedings or arbitrations. 
 
Regulation 9 stipulates that if a dispute in terms of section 189A(7)(b)(ii) is lodged, it must be 
referred to the Labour Court within 90 days of the notice of termination or if no notice had 
been given, then within 90 days of dismissal. 
 
Regulation 10 stipulates that an agreement must be concluded by the consulting party 
representing the majority of the employees concerned.  The aim of the facilitation process is 
to reach an agreement pertaining to the subject of consultation as envisaged in section 189 
and to seek to negotiate on the terms of the proposed retrenchment and minimize 
retrenchment if possible.  If not the parties will try and secure the best alternative for the 
affected parties and issues of discussion would also involve matters relating to severance pay 
and other social assistance policies which are not regulated in the Act, but the parties are free 
to include such discussion in the negotiation process.  
 
3.3.1 SECTION 189A(7) 
 
Section 189A(7) stipulates the following: 
 
„If a facilitator is appointed in terms of subsection (3) or (4), and 60 days have elapsed 
from the date on which notice was given in terms of section 189(3) – 
 
(a) the employer may give notice to terminate the contracts of employment in 
accordance with section 37(1) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act; and 
 
(b) a registered trade union or the employees who have received notice of termination 
may either – 
 
(i) give notice of a strike in terms of section 64(1)(b) or (d); or 
 
(ii) refer a dispute concerning whether there is a fair reason for the dismissal to 
the Labour Court in terms of section 191(11).‟ 
 
It is evident that the aforementioned section envisages a 60-day period during which the 
facilitation will take place.  During this time an employer cannot proceed with retrenchments 
and the affected employees cannot embark on strike action.  This 60-day period runs from the 
date of the section 189(3) notice and not when request is made for a facilitator or when the 
facilitation begins; this period may, however, be varied by agreement between the relevant 
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role players, namely the employer and employees in terms of section 189A(2)(c).  Once this 
period has expired, the employer may decide to terminate the employment relationship by 
retrenching the employees.  The employees may give 48 hours‟ notice of their intention to 
strike on the issue.  They have an election and can refer a dispute relating to the substantive 
fairness to the Labour Court or they can embark on strike action. 
 
It is important to ensure that proper notification of envisaged retrenchment consultations take 
place as doing so incorrectly would have dire consequences for the employer as was seen in 
National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and Others v General Motors of South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd.
50
  The facts of the matter are briefly as follows; as world wide recession started to 
bite, current and projected production requirements began to fall away dramatically.  The 
projected production figure shrank to first 61900 and then, by 2008 to around 50 000 vehicles.  
By May 2009, the figures crashed to 25 000 vehicles per year. 
 
On 1 July 2008, GMSA issued a notice inviting trade unions to consult in terms of Section 
189(3).  Facilitation process was embarked upon, commencing July 2008 and ending in 
September 2008.  Several alternatives to compulsory redundancy were considered. GM 
advised the union that 520 positions would be at stake and that the downsizing would occur 
over a period of 3-4months.  It added further that if a headcount reduction was required, the 
company will proceed with retrenchments on the basis as identified during the course of the 
consultative process. 
 
Immediately upon the expiry of the 60 day period, GM gave notices of termination and 1000 
employees were affected by the reduction exercise.  This was achieved by early retirements, 
voluntary packages and the release of temporary employees.  The company had an extended 
shut down period and adverse market conditions continued into 2009.  The company thus 
contemplated further retrenchments.  In February 2009, it then sent to Numsa a letter stating 
that they would be continuing implementation following the decision taken following upon 
section 189 process.  They furthermore proposed a change in shift pattern as an alternative to 
job cuts. 
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In the first week of April 2009, 400 employees were given notices of possible retrenchment 
and by the end of that month; the services of the employees concerned were terminated.  On 
15 May 2009, Numsa challenged the procedure and brought urgent proceedings in the Labour 
Court.  Its main contention was that GM should have recommenced section 189A proceedings 
and reissued notices in terms of section 189(3). 
 
Van Niekerk J, reasoned that the notice contemplated three indicators; namely – 
 
„(1) some raison d etre, usually in some form of commercial rationale for the 
aforeshadowed consultation process. 
 
(2) A timescale for the anticipated reduction in workforce. 
 
(3) The anticipated scale for the reduction in workforce.‟ 
 
The court held that the notice of 1 July 2008 was only valid for the downsizing that occurred 
that year as a period of five months separated the conclusion of the statutory consultation 
process.  GM‟s position was that the statutory process had come to an end and that there were 
no further communications with the unions that it considered the process to be in effect. 
 
The court further concluded that the retrenchments of 2009, flowed from a fresh set of facts, 
outside the timeframe foreshadowed in the July 2008 notice.  GM was thus obliged to issue a 
fresh notification and thus the dismissals dated April 2009, were procedurally unfair. 
 
Even if the process of facilitation took place, the issue as to whether or not the dismissal is 
fair could possibly still be a burning issue if the consultation process had not been followed or 
the process had not been followed properly and all the issues relating to the retrenchment had 
not been discussed and negotiated upon.  The need for consultation plays an important role in 
the entire retrenchment process and therefore has to be meaningful.  If the union finds that the 
substantive reasons for the dismissals are unfair it may elect to refer the matter to the Labour 
Court for adjudication in terms of the aforementioned section. 
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3.4 SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION 
 
In terms of the 1956 Act, the essence of procedural fairness was seen as being the employer‟s 
duty to consult about the impending dismissals with the employees concerned.  Sufficient 
notice was required for the employees or union to engage in meaningful consultation.
51
 
 
3.4.1 THE PARTIES TO CONSULTATION 
 
Section 189A does not explicitly stipulate what the content of consultations would be. Instead 
it makes reference to a section 189(3) notice which specifies areas of consultation. 
 
Section 189(1) of the Act stipulates with whom this consultation process is to take place and 
thus provides as follows: 
 
„(1) When an employer contemplates dismissing one or more employees for reasons 
based on the employer‟s operational requirements, the employer must consult – 
 
(a) any person whom the employer is required to consult in terms of a collective 
agreement; 
 
(b) if there is no collective agreement that requires consultation – 
 
(i) a workplace forum, if the employees likely to be affected by the 
proposed dismissals are employed in a workplace in respect of which 
there is a workplace forum; and 
 
(ii) any registered trade union whose members are likely to be affected by 
the proposed dismissals; 
 
(c) if there is no workplace forum in the workplace in which the employees 
likely to be affected by the proposed dismissals are employed, any registered 
trade union whose members are likely to be affected by the proposed 
dismissals; or 
 
(d) if there is no such trade union, the employees likely to be affected by the 
proposed dismissals or their representatives.‟ 
 
This section clearly identifies who the consulting parties are and that discussions aimed at 
reaching consensus should be held with any person who the parties have agreed upon in terms 
of the collective agreement, or a workplace forum, a registered trade union who members are 
likely to be affected by the proposed dismissals or if there is no trade union, the employees 
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likely to be affected by the proposed dismissal or the representatives nominated for that 
purpose. 
 
In National Union of Mineworkers and Others v Geffens Diamond Cutting,
52
 the employer did 
not consult with the minority union, the court concluded that the respondent was not obliged 
in terms of the law to consult with a minority union. 
 
In FAWU v National Sorghum Breweries
53
 a retrenchment was found to be unfair because the 
employer had consulted directly with its employees without notifying their union.  It is thus 
important for any employer embarking on a retrenchment process to keep in mind when its 
workforce is unionized or when there are structures in place where bargaining may take place, 
that it is essential to consult with the relevant parties and not risk consulting on a one-on-one 
basis with employees. 
 
In Van Der Merwe v McDulding Motors
54
 the court held that the employer had acted unfairly 
by inducing its employees to enter into a retrenchment agreement without consulting their 
union. 
 
3.4.2 THE CONTENT OF THE DUTY TO CONSULT 
 
However, should a number of questions relating to the employer‟s duty to consult and the 
content of the consultation arise, questions such as when the consultation should take place, 
what should be the content of the consultation and furthermore to what extent, should there be 
payment with regard to severance pay, it is the employer‟s obligation to initiate relevant 
consultation.
55
 
 
The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 went on to answer those questions.  Consultation as 
defined in section 189(3) to section 189(6) of the Act is the crux of procedural fairness 
relating to retrenchment.
56
  These provisions are applicable to section 189A as well and 
therefore remain the focal point of consultations within the facilitation process. 
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Section 189 requires an employer to consult with the employees or their representatives 
before embarking on the retrenchment process, as the Act terms this consultation.  The term is 
defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary
57
 as 
 
„to take counsel, seek information or advice from person, book or to take into 
consideration‟. 
 
Under the previous Act, consultations were initially considered a more limited form of 
interaction than negotiation, and in MAWU v Hart Ltd
58
 a prevalent view was that „to consult‟ 
is merely to take counsel, hear representations and take advice whereas „to negotiate‟ means 
to engage in discussions and bargaining with the view to reaching a compromise and 
agreement. 
 
In Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA
59
 the Appellate Division accepted the 
characterisation of consultation as a „joint problem-solving exercise with the parties striving 
for consensus where possible.  The problem-solving concept aims at getting disputing parties 
to see their differences in the form of joint problem-solving to which both parties are 
committed to seek solutions rather than simply pursuing their own respective positions in a 
manner which excludes the other parties‟ interests as well‟. 
 
Under the current Act parties are required to consult and engage in a meaningful joint 
consensus-seeking process and attempt to reach consensus on the topics on which they are 
required to consult.
60
 
 
Section 189(2) of the Act
61
 stipulates the following: 
 
„(2) The employer and the other consulting parties must in the consultation envisaged 
by subsections (1) and (3) engage in a meaningful joint consensus-seeking process 
and attempt to reach consensus on – 
 
(a) appropriate measures – 
 
                                                 
57
  5
th
 edition. 
58
  (1985) 6 ILJ 478 (IC). 
59
  (1994) 15 ILJ 1247 (A).  
60
  S 189(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
61
  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
 28 
(i) to avoid the dismissals; 
(ii) to minimise the number of dismissals; 
(iii) to change the timing of the dismissals; and 
(iv) to mitigate the adverse effects of the dismissals; 
 
(b) the method for selecting the employees to be dismissed; and 
 
(c) the severance pay for dismissed employees.‟ 
 
In Johnson & Johnson (Pty) Ltd v CWIU
62
 it was held that „all these primary formal 
obligations of an employer are geared to a specific purpose, namely to attempt to reach 
consensus on the objects listed in section 189(2).  The ultimate purpose of section 189(2) is 
thus to achieve a joint consensus-seeking process‟. 
 
3.4.2.1 APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO AVOID DISMISSAL 
 
The aim of this provision is clearly to ensure that dismissals are avoided at all cost.  An 
obvious measure to avoid dismissal is redeployment of the affected employees to appropriate 
alternative positions.  An example would be to eliminate wasteful production techniques 
which may enhance competitiveness without recourse to retrenchments.
63
  
 
If it is possible to avoid some or all of the dismissals it must follow that retrenchment is 
unnecessary and that there is no sound reasons for it, hence in National Union of Metal 
Workers of SA v Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd
64
 the Labour Appeal Court held that there 
was no clear dividing line between the decision to retrench and the implementation of that 
decision.  On the contrary, said the court, the entire process must be fair, and fairness in the 
retrenchment process was first and foremost, directly linked with whether termination of 
employment is the only reasonable option in the circumstances. 
 
Alternatives have to be tabled; examples are moratorium on hiring new employees, transfer of 
affected employees, rationalisation, where the courts found that dismissal could be avoided by 
redeploying the employee, it might hold that the dismissal was not the  last resort and hence 
unfair.
65
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3.4.2.2 APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO MINIMIZE DISMISSAL 
 
The Act requires the parties to attempt to reach agreement on measures to minimize the 
dismissals.  Often at this stage the parties realize that the need for a retrenchment may 
inevitable and may therefore embark on a process of minimizing the number of dismissals. 
 
If the process of avoiding dismissals is not successful, then parties must attempt to minimise 
the number of dismissals.  Measures to minimize dismissals include: 
 
„(a) the transfer of redundant employees to other positions or sections of the same 
undertaking; 
 
(b) asking employees to volunteer for retrenchment; 
 
(c) the spreading of retrenchment over a period of time in order to allow for a natural 
reduction in personnel numbers through example resignations; 
 
(d) training or retraining of redundant employees to enable them to take up alternative 
positions in the same undertaking.‟
66
 
 
3.4.2.3 APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO CHANGE THE TIMING OF THE 
DISMISSAL 
 
At the commencement of the consultation process the employer must indicate when it intends 
to terminate the affected employees‟ services.  
 
In terms of section 189A the act regulates the relevant timeframes in which to consult via the 
services of a facilitator.  Once facilitation has been requested the parties may not give notice 
prior to the 60 days having elapsed.  In other words the consulting parties, namely the trade 
union representatives, employees representing non unionized individuals and members of 
workplace forums have to engage in the consultation process during this period. 
 
The timing of dismissals can be critical for employees selected for retrenchment and the 
adjustment of the timing could therefore afford the selected employees with the opportunity to 
set their affairs in order and thus minimize the effects of the dismissal.
67
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3.4.2.4 APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO MITIGATE THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF 
THE DISMISSAL 
 
In the past the Industrial Court found it „recommendable‟ for employers to assist dismissed 
employees in finding alternative employment within and outside the firm or giving dismissed 
employees priority in redeployment when suitable jobs become available.  The Labour 
Relations Act does not prescribe such measures, but imposes a duty to consult in this regard.
68
 
 
In practice and important feature of the agreements reached during the consultation process by 
means of a facilitator is that dismissed employees have the right to preferential recruitment if 
and when suitable vacancies arise.  This once again may be seen as a form of protection for 
the dismissed employee in that if the employer does not honour the agreement when suitable 
vacancies arise then the employee has recourse in terms of the unfair Labour Practice 
provision in terms of section 186(2).  Prior to this the Appellate Division in National 
Automobile & Allied Workers Union v Borg Warner SA (Pty) Ltd
69
 stated that the employer 
would only be bound for a reasonable period; however, the enactment of the aforementioned 
provision changed this due to the fact that in terms of section 191(1)(b)(ii), as a dispute may 
be referred to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration within in relation 
to an unfair labour practice within 90 days of the date on which the unfair labour practice 
arose or within 90 days from which the employees became aware of the unfair labour 
practice.  
 
3.4.2.5 METHOD OF SELECTION 
 
Under the previous dispensation, one of the objectives of a consultation process was to reach 
consensus on the criteria for dismissal, failing which the employer had to apply fair and 
objective criteria.  The current position is that where consultation produces agreed criteria, 
selection should proceed and where the consultation process has failed to produce criteria the 
employer should go ahead and select criteria that are fair and objective.
70
 
 
If the above scenario should arise in the instance where a facilitation has been requested, it 
will be the duty of the facilitator to try and conciliate that aspect of the dispute by having side 
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caucuses, doing reality testing, pointing out the advantages and disadvantages of reaching a 
common understanding and in so doing encourage the parties to reach consensus with regard 
to the issue at hand. 
 
The following examples of selection criteria may be used: 
 
(a) The customary method of selecting employees is LIFO, namely last in first out, where 
employees with the shortest service are chosen first.
71
 
 
(b) Skills. 
 
(c) Qualifications. 
 
(d)  Bumping. 
 
With regard to bumping the following principles were held in Porter Motor Group v 
Karachi:
72
 
 
(a) the employer is required to consult with regard to bumping; 
 
(b) the point of departure is LIFO; 
 
(c) horizontal bumping should take place before vertical bumping; 
 
(d) bumping should be implemented to create minimum possible disruption for the 
employer; 
 
(e) geographical limits should be placed on the unit for selection; 
 
(f) the size of the unit will depend on the mobility and career paths of the affected 
employees; 
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(g) bumping must be effected with due regard to the retention of necessary skills; 
 
(h) downward bumping should be effected where the employee is prepared to accept the 
downgrading in work and status. 
 
These criteria are furthermore also subject to the facilitation process and the parties are 
encouraged to reach consensus with regard to aspects such as these.  Where no consensus has 
been reached the employer should use criteria which is fair and objective as required by 
section 189(7)(b).  This principle was confirmed in CWIU and Others v Latex Surgical 
Products (Pty) Ltd
73
 where the court concluded that the criteria was not fair and objective, but 
that some of the criteria had been subjective and therefore rendered the dismissal 
substantively unfair. 
 
In the Perumal & Another v Tiger Brands
74
 the employer failed to engage the union, FAWU.  
As a result it failed to test its criteria for fairness with FAWU.  From this it is evident that 
court took into account the influence of procedural unfairness in assessing substantive fairness 
of the applicants‟ dismissal.  In this matter the employer subjected the employee‟s to 
assessments and they were to answer a questionnaire designed to assess the supervisor‟s 
knowledge about the products and processes.  The employee was not happy to participate 
even though her employer was confidant she would fare well.  At that stage, she was 
recovering from bipolar depression and was undergoing a stressful divorce.  She furthermore 
felt that the panelists would be biased.  The interview went ahead and according to the 
panelists she performed badly.  The court was startled at her performance in the interview in 
comparison to her work performance.  The court referred to the abovementioned case and 
confirmed that the criteria sued were subjective and that the company had not demonstrated 
fair and objective criteria. 
 
3.4.2.6 SEVERANCE PAY 
 
Severance pay is currently regulated by section 41 of the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act
75
 and stipulates the following: 
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„(1) For the purposes of this section, “operational requirements” means requirements 
based on the economic, technological, structural or similar needs of an employer. 
 
(2) An employer must pay an employee who is dismissed for reasons based on the 
employer‟s operational requirements or whose contract of employment terminates 
or is terminated in terms of section 38 of the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act No. 24 of 
1936) severance pay equal to at least one week‟s remuneration for each completed 
year of continuous service with that employer, calculated in accordance with section 
35. 
 
(3) The Minister may vary the amount of severance pay in terms of subsection (2) by 
notice in the Gazette.  This variation may only be done after consulting NEDLAC 
and the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council established under 
Schedule 1 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995. 
 
(4) An employee who unreasonably refuses to accept the employer‟s offer of alternative 
employment with that employer or any other employer, is not entitled to severance 
pay in terms of subsection (2). 
 
(5) The payment of severance pay in compliance with this section does not affect an 
employee‟s right to any other amount payable according to law. 
 
(6) If there is a dispute only about the entitlement to severance pay in terms of this 
section, the employee may refer the dispute in writing to –  
 
(a) a council, if the parties to the dispute fall within the registered scope of that 
council; or 
 
(b) the CCMA, if no council has jurisdiction. 
 
(7) The employee who refers the dispute to the council or the CCMA must satisfy it 
that a copy of the referral has been served on all the other parties to the dispute. 
 
(8) The council or the CCMA must attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation. 
 
(9) If the dispute remains unresolved, the employee may refer it to arbitration. 
 
(10) If the Labour Court is adjudicating a dispute about a dismissal based on the 
employer‟s operational requirements, the Court may inquire into and determine the 
amount of any severance pay to which the dismissed employee may be entitled and 
the Court may make an order directing the employer to pay that amount.‟ 
 
This Act regulates that an employer has to pay an employee at least one week‟s pay for every 
completed year of service.  Again, this may be a negotiated term of the consultation process 
and the possibility of severance pay in excess of the minimum standard is possible.  Where 
this is applicable, the provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act including the 
calculation applicable to remuneration are inapplicable.
76
  The aim of severance pay is to 
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cushion the blow of unemployment and it acts as compensation to employees with long 
service who have lost their jobs by no fault of themselves.
77
 
 
In SATU obo Van As v Kohler Flexible Packaging
78
it was held that where the severance pay 
in excess has been granted, the provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act in 
relation to the calculation of remuneration is not applicable.  Employees who do not accept an 
alternative position to retrenchment are not entitled to severance pay in terms of section 189 
of the Act. 
 
In Pretorius v Rustenburg Local Municipality and others
79
 the court majority held against the 
appellant and summarized his position as being one that has become redundant.  The court 
furthermore concluded that the test was that of reasonableness.  If the employee rejected the 
offer, he was not entitled to severance pay, but if was an unreasonable offer and he rejected it 
then he would be entitled to severance pay. 
 
The question arises if one accepts the offer of severance pay, does that debar one from 
challenging the fairness of the dismissal?  This question came to the fore in NASUWU and 
another v Pearwood Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Wolf Security and another,
80
 Bhoola found for 
the employee and concluded the following: 
 
„Acceptance of and claims for severance pay cannot constitute waiver of the rights of the 
individual applicants to pursue their claims in respect of their unfair termination based on 
operational requirements.  The applicants‟ a guaranteed right to fair labour practices, and 
are entitled to have their claim in respect of the alleged unfair dismissal adjudicated.‟ 
 
Severance pay is furthermore subject to prescription and an employee who has not received a 
payment in lieu of severance pay should not sit back, but act within 3 years as prescribed by 
the Prescription Act.
81
  This principle was upheld in Mampura and Others v Maxis strategic 
Alliance (Pty) Ltd,
82
 where the court concluded that the Act does in fact apply to claims under 
the Labour Relations Act. 
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CHAPTER 4 
IF NO FACILITATION IS REQUESTED 
 
4.1 SECTION 189(8) 
 
Section 189A(8)(a) of the Labour Relations Act
83
 stipulates that if no facilitator is appointed a 
party may not refer a dispute to a council or the Commission unless a period of 30 days has 
passed from the date on which the notice was given to retrench in terms of section 189(3). 
 
Once these periods have elapsed, the employer may give notice to terminate the contracts of 
employment in terms of section 37 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act.
84
  This, 
however, may only take place if the parties have referred the matter either to the CCMA or 
the bargaining council and the matter remains unresolved after conciliation or the statutory 
period of 30 days has elapsed since the referral.
85
  It appears that the dispute will be referred 
in terms of section 64 of the Act.
86
  Section 189A envisages that employees will be entitled to 
strike in reaction to a proposed retrenchment.  The reference of section 64(1)(a) is 
understandable, but it would have been far clearer by simply providing a 60-day time period 
during which consultation without facilitation has to take place and then to provide for the 
right to strike.
87
 
 
From the above it is apparent that if an employer wishes to retrench its employees in instances 
where no facilitation has taken place, the employer will have to refer a dispute to the CCMA 
or the Bargaining Council after the initial 30-day period and wait a further 30 days before 
terminating the services of employees in accordance with section 37 of the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act. 
 
Section 189A(8)(b) furthermore also stipulates that a „registered trade union or employees 
who have received notice of termination‟ may give notice to strike in terms of section 
64(1)(b) or (d), alternatively to refer the dispute concerning whether there is a fair reason for 
the dismissal to the Labour Court in terms of section 191(11).  Unions have a statutory right 
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to be consulted over retrenchments and other dismissals for operational requirements only if 
they are registered.  But unregistered unions can by agreement acquire a consultation right 
that the statute will recognize.
88
  In principle, there is no reason why by reason of their 
recognition, they at least should not have equal rights to call a strike action over dismissals for 
operational requirements.
89
  The Act ensures the right to strike.  However, to enforce that 
right, registration is a prerequisite for exercising the right.  Members may, however, strike in 
their own capacity and thereby temporarily solve the problem.
90
 
 
In National Union of Mineworkers v De Beers Group Services (Pty) Ltd & Another,
91
 the 
facts of the matter being briefly as follows; De Beers Consolidated Mines and De Beers 
Corporate Services are members of the De Beers Group in South Africa.  De Beers 
Consolidated Mines (DBCM) owns and operates a number of mines, including Kimberly, 
Venitia, Finnsch, Namaqualand and Voorspoed and employed 3700 employees prior to 
retrenchments.  The applicant has organizational and collective rights at each DBCM mine.  
The employer stated that retrenchments were necessitated by the global economic crash, 
which had a significant effect on the diamond industry since 2008 and which is expected to 
continue over the next few years.  As a result, De Beers worldwide was forced to reprioritize 
its strategy to conserve cash and equity.  As a result thereof there was a need to reorganize 
and restructure all the business units worldwide.  This process resulted in significant job 
losses worldwide.  In South Africa, the retrenchment at Exploration involved 4 employees, at 
DBCM 570 employees and at DTC SA 30 employees‟. 
 
At the Exploration Group, on 21 January 2009, notices were issued to individual employees 
stating that retrenchments were envisaged and that the company anticipated issuing notices of 
retrenchment to affected employees from 23 March 2009.  No facilitator was appointed and 
on 13 March 2009 notices of termination were issued to 4 union officials.  The notice periods 
would run from 23 March 2009, until 23 April 2009. The union referred a dispute in terms of 
section 189 (8)(a) to the CCMA for conciliation. 
 
At De Beers Consolidated Mines, notices in terms of section 189(3) were issued on 19 
January 2009 in respect of Kimberly, Finsch, and Namaqualand Mines to 1 467 employees. 
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Noices were accompanied with statements stipulating that the employer was anticipating 
retrenchment from 19 March 2009.  On 26 and 30 March 2009 as well as 7 April 2009, De 
beers issued notices of termination.  Their notice period would expire on 30 April 2009.  The 
union also referred a dispute to the CCMA after which a certificate of non-resolution was 
issued. 
 
With regard to the Diamond Trading Company SA, on 28 January 2009, a notice in terms of 
section 189(3) was issued stipulating that the employer contemplated the retrenchment of 65 
employees.  A request for facilitation was made, but the union failed to attend and on 27 
March 2009, the company issued notices of retrenchment effective 30 March 2009. 
 
In two of the three matters, the union decided to refer disputes relating to statutory 
conciliation not long after the employer issued notices of termination.  Bhoola J held that the 
employer could not have issued notice of termination prior to the elapsing of the statutory 
timeframe.  The earliest dates on which the employer could have issued notices of termination 
would have been the dates on which the certificates of outcome of conciliation had been 
issued.  
 
The notices of termination were premature and were held to be invalid and of no force and 
effect.  The court found that reinstatement of the employees from the date of termination was 
the appropriate remedy. 
 
Earlier on in the judgment of Leoni Wiring Systems ( Pty) Ltd v Numsa and others,
92
 Nel J 
held that referral to conciliation where no facilitator has been appointed, only becomes 
necessary in the event that there is prior to the termination for operational reasons some other 
dispute between employer and employee regarding the substantive and procedural fairness of 
the dismissal.  Bhoola J in the De Beers‟ case deviated from this reasoning  and ordered that 
the notices were of no force and effect in that it did not comply with the provisions of section 
189A(7) and (8) and were furthermore procedurally unfair. 
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4.2 SECTION 189A(9) 
 
Notice of a commencement of strike may be given if the employer dismissed or gives notice 
to dismiss prior to the expiry of the periods referred to in subsection (7) and (8). 
 
4.3 SECTION 189A(10)(a) 
 
This section deals exclusively with disputes about the reason for the dismissal and therefore 
the challenge is substantive as opposed to a procedural one.  Read in isolation the section 
might be thought to suggest that only declaratory relief can be competently claimed.  This, 
however, is not as section 186 defines what an unfair dismissal „if the employer fails to prove 
that the reason for the dismissal is fair, based on the employer‟s operational requirements‟.93  
A consulting party may thus not give notice to strike in terms this section if it has referred a 
dispute concerning whether there is a „fair‟ reason for the dismissal to the Labour Court.94 
 
Section 189A(10)(b) stipulates that if a trade union gives notice to strike, then no member of 
that union and no employee with whom a collective agreement was concluded by that trade 
union may refer the matter to the Labour Court.  Parties within the Bargaining Unit are bound 
by the majoritarian principle and cannot refer the matter to the Labour Court if they differ 
with regard to the viewpoint being taken.  By joining a union, the members submit to the will 
of a collectivity, but it by no means follows that non-members should be forced to confront 
this consequence with equal equanimity; employers may be faced with the situation of 
consulting with more than one union.
95
  In this instance the employer may face a strike 
emanating from one and court action from the other.  Each union‟s election binds its 
members. 
 
4.4 SECTION 189A(13) 
 
This section provides that if an employer does not comply with procedure the consulting party 
may approach the Labour Court by way of application for an order: 
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(a) compelling the employer to comply with fair procedure; 
 
(b) interdicting or restraining the employer from dismissing an employee prior to complying 
with fair procedure; 
 
(c) directing the employer to reinstate the employee(s) until it has complied with a fair 
procedure; 
 
(d) make an award of compensation, if an order in terms of paragraph (a) – (c) of the 
aforementioned section is not appropriate. 
 
This particular provision relates to consulting parties, who may either be employees or 
employers or alternatively trade unions or employer‟s organizations.  The aim of section 
189A(13) of the Act
96
 is to provide a remedy for employees to approach the Labour Court to 
set their employer on the right track where there is a genuine and clear cut procedural 
unfairness which goes to the core of the process.  Minor infringements of procedure will not 
benefit from the court‟s discretionary power to grant a remedy in terms of the aforementioned 
sub-section.
97
 
 
The issue of procedural fairness has been regulated by this particular provision and must be 
challenged by the Labour Court, separately under the provision of this sub-section.  
Substantive fairness of the dismissal may be challenged by either strike action, or 
alternatively an election of adjudication at the Labour Court.  One of the reasons for this 
splitting of the two criteria is that procedural defects should be remedied by quick and 
accessible judicial proceedings, whereas the underlying business decision to retrench should 
be structured by a facilitation process and thereafter, if need be, sorted out either by power 
play or adjudication.
98
 
 
In NUMSA v Five Star Engineering
99
 the individual applicants in this matter were employed 
by the respondent, Five Star Engineering, for the refurbishment of a seagoing vessel.  They 
were retrenched upon completion of the project, but contested the fairness of the dismissal.  
                                                 
96
  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
97
  Brassey Commentary on the Labour Relations Act 119. 
98
  Thompson „Retrenchments and Restructuring‟ (2005) Current Labour Law 66. 
99
  [2005] 1 BLLR 53 (LC). 
 40 
The challenge was a procedural one, but the matter was postponed and later joined with issues 
relating to substantive fairness. 
 
The question Murphy AJ had to consider was whether indeed the court had jurisdiction to 
entertain the matter as the issues relating to the substantive fairness had not been conciliated.  
The court granted a postponement for the adjudication of the point relating to section 
189A(13), but concluded that it was bound by the Labour Appeal Court‟s decision in NUMSA 
v Driveline Technologies (Pty) Ltd,
100
 where Zondo AJP stated it was clear that the wording 
of section 191(5) imposes a referral of a dismissal dispute to conciliation as a pre-condition 
before such a dispute can either be arbitrated or referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. 
 
The court therefore could not here the issues relating to the substantive fairness and the court 
was obliged to declare that it lacked the jurisdiction to hear the matter until the applicants 
adhered to the provision of the Act and referred the dispute to the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration for conciliation. 
 
This approach may be criticized as in disputes relating to retrenchments, substantive and 
procedural fairness are interlinked and surely the courts cannot adequately decide on 
procedure without hearing the substantive issues.  One could further conclude that it is 
illogical for the two processes to be separated as much as case law supports the notion of 
substantive and procedural fairness being linked. 
 
In RAWUSA v Schuurman Metal Pressing (Pty) Ltd the court echoed similar sentiments as it 
did in the Five Star case.  However, the court went on to conclude that section 189A(13) was 
not a tool to thwart the retrenchment process, where the process is otherwise capable of being 
rescued by genuine efforts to cure such flaws as may exist.  Moreover, it would be 
cumbersome if not futile to make an order compelling the respondent to issue a notice 
disclosing information which it already has disclosed; hence the application was dismissed. 
 
It is evident that the main purpose of section 189A(13) is to provide a remedy to employees to 
approach the Labour Court in instances where there is a genuine and deliberate procedural 
defect infringing on the rights of the affected employees.  The employer would then have the 
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opportunity to remedy the defect.  This provision should not be used as a tactic to delay the 
process.  
 
In National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v General Motors of SA (Pty) Ltd,
101
 the 
court concluded that the company had to issue new notices in terms of section 189(3) as it 
could not have relied on the notice issued the previous year, where the retrenchment process 
had been completed.  It went further and made the following comments with regard to the 
procedural challenges made by the union: 
 
„Had Numsa acted expediously this court could have and timeously provided both parties 
with guidance at an appropriate stage, and long before GM had actually given notice and 
paid its employees in lieu of notice.  If mistaken, GM would also have been afforded the 
opportunity of correcting any established procedural irregularities, and of ensuing – in the 
face of undeniable operational requirements- that it was able to timeously address any 
procedural concerns.  Instead, this court is asked to reinstate employees after they have 
had the benefit of payment in lieu of notice and under GM has reorganized its affairs to 
meet its projected production requirements.  As a result it is not appropriate to order 
reinstatement of the dismissed employees, and the remedy to which they are limited is that 
of compensation.‟ 
 
The court accepted that it could play a supervisory role in ensuring that fair process was 
followed, in respect of employees who had not yet been retrenched.  In the case of procedural 
unfairness, section 189(13) provides speedy relief.
102
  In the case of substantive unfairness, 
the aggrieved employees‟ have recourse to strike action.  This then begs the question whether 
the same right is afforded to instances where procedural irregularities occur.  The answer is 
fairly simple in that section 189(13) has been enacted, for speedy and effective relief in 
instances where employers do not adhere to fair procedure.  The remedy applicable to 
employees who allege that procedural irregularities have occurred have recourse to court in 
terms of the aforementioned section.  It was clearly the intention of the legislature, that issues 
relating to procedure be adjudicated upon and that recourse to strike action was not an option. 
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4.5 SECTION 189A(19) 
 
This section places constraints on the Labour Court‟s discretion.  If criteria are met, the court 
must find that the dismissal was fair, if not, then the court must decide the matter in 
accordance with the pre-existing principles.
103
 
 
The provision dictates that the court must find that the employee was dismissed for a fair 
reason if the following criteria are met: 
 
(a) the dismissal was to give effect to a requirement based on the employer‟s economic, 
technological, structural or similar needs; 
 
(b) the dismissal was operational on rational ground; 
 
(c) there was a proper consideration for the alternatives; 
 
(d) the selection criteria were fair and objective. 
 
The test used by the courts in previous matters prior to the enactment of this provision, is the 
rationality test, asking itself if the retrenchment was a rational response to the employer‟s 
plight and therefore this subsection captures the rationality test.
104
 
 
The intention of this sub-section is to ensure that courts make rational decisions on large scale 
retrenchments that have far-reaching consequences.
105
 
 
Sub-section 19(a) stipulates that a dismissal for operational requirements may take place to 
give effect to the employer‟s economic, technological, structural or similar needs.  This 
provision provides a reason for dismissing an employee for operational requirements and 
establishes the requirements an employer has to meet. 
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Subsection 19(b) provides the basis for consideration of the means used by the decision-
maker; it makes it plain that the means employed, namely dismissal, must conduce to the 
attainment of the objective; they must, as it is sometimes put, be rationally connected to the 
object.
106
  The employer‟s decision has to be justifiable on rational grounds. 
 
Sub-section 19(c) sets the criterion that a proper consideration of alternatives should have 
been canvassed and considered in a proper manner.  Taken literally the clause requires the 
employer simply to consider the alternatives, but to do so properly.  It was the intention of the 
legislature that a process of proper consideration should have taken place.
107
  It is important 
for an employer to adopt alternatives that are proportionate to the attainment of the 
objectives.
108
  This approach was taken by Davis AJA in BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v 
SACTWU.
109
 
 
Sub-section 19(d) stipulates that the selection criteria used when deciding which employees 
will be dismissed should be fair and objective.  Usually the principles of LIFO are applicable 
when manual workers are being laid off, but when employees of skill are under scrutiny an 
evaluation of aptitudes is possible.
110
  The key is to ensure that the system is properly tailored 
to the employer‟s objectives, internally coherent and transparent.111 
 
Although the subsection is contained in section 189A, which specifically deals with large 
scale retrenchments, it is submitted that the provision should equally be applied in small scale 
retrenchments.  It will be untenable if the requirement of substantive fairness requirements for 
large and small scale retrenchments are different. 
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CHAPTER 5 
TRAINING LAY OFF 
 
5.1 BACKGROUND  
 
The current recession has affected South Africa‟s economy as many workers have been faced 
with retrenchments as companies have been force to cut costs.  To assist employees and 
protect them from losing their employment, the Department of Labour and the CCMA, in 
consultation with Sector Education and Training authorities have developed a Training Lay 
Off Scheme as a way of reducing possible retrenchments. 
 
5.2 WHAT IS TRAINING LAY OFF 
 
Training lay off is a temporary suspension of work for a worker or group of workers that is 
sued for training purposes.  The lay depends on an agreement between the trade union and the 
employer.  The Scheme is voluntary, but the social partners strongly encourage participation 
as an alternative to retrenchment. 
 
The employer must continue the contract of employment. Parties are free to negotiate a 
continuation of existing social benefit contributions such as medical aid scheme and housing 
allowances.  Employers shall pay full contributions to a basic social security package to 
which a worker is entitled at the time of the introduction of the training lay off.  The payment 
of these contributions will be for the duration of the training period.  The contract of 
employment stays in tact, but the wage component changes and workers agree to forgo the 
salary to undergo the training.
112
 
 
The training Scheme is based on the principle that it will be available for employers are 
affected by the economic recession and the following entities will play a vital role:
113
 
 
 The CCMA, which will be responsible for all facilitating overseeing and verifying all 
training, lay off consultations and agreements. Compliance with general rules and 
procedures of the scheme will have to be adhered to. 
                                                 
112
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 SETAS will be responsible for training, funding training costs. 
 
 NSF will be responsible for training allowances and disbursing funds to employers. 
 
 Employers, bargaining councils and trade unions will play an active role in the training 
lay off scheme. 
 
 The Department of Labour will be responsible for the overseeing and monitoring the 
Scheme. 
 
 The Department of Trade and Industry will be responsible for ensuring that distressed 
sector support is co-coordinated with the Training Lay off Scheme. 
 
 The Economic Development Department will be responsible for assessing the economic 
and development impact of the training lay off scheme. 
 
Application will be made directly to the CCMA on the prescribed form, but in certain cases, 
employers and unions will embark on this process as an alternative to retrenchment and the 
CCMA facilitator would have to facilitate an agreement and ensure that the agreement 
complies with the terms of the training layoff scheme.  In 2010, 16 employers and 1250 
employees throughout the Eastern Cape participated in the scheme.
114
   
 
5.3 STATISTICS
115
 
 
For the period 2005 to 2009 the following information was available from the CCMA relating 
to the number of section 189A Facilitations it conducted during the aforementioned period. 
 
YEAR PROCESS REFERRALS PERCENTAGE 
2005/2006 S 189 facilitations 226 -50% 
2006/2007  114 -50% 
2007/2008  184 62% 
2008/2009  394 214% 
                                                 
114
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115
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From the data available, it is clear that during 2005 -2006 there was a decrease in referrals 
compared to other years and a particular dip in 2006 -2007.  From 2007 to date, the statistics 
show that there has been a marked increase in the number of referrals and this is line with the 
current economic state of South Africa.  2008-2009 was the worst in that the number of 
referrals exceeded any other year and once again proved that recession was in full swing. 
 
The following information was available from the CCMA: Eastern Cape Region with regard 
to the section 189A facilitations. 
 
CASE SECTOR AFFECTED 
EMPLOYEES 
TOTAL 
RETRENCHED 
VOLUTARY JOBS 
SAVED 
ECPE280-10 CHEMICAL 
 
789 
 
128 
 
128 
 
661 
 
ECPE1405-10 FOOD 
 
50 
 
7 
 
7 
 
43 
 
ECPE1285-10 MOTOR 
 
56 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
ECPE1927-10 HOSPITATILY 
 
14 
 
14 
 
14 
 
 
 
ECPE2226-10 AGRICULTURE 
 
31 
 
10 
 
10 
 
21 
 
ECPE2530-10 METAL 
 
23 
 
14 
 
14 
 
9 
 
 
ECPE2626-10 BUSINESS 
 
WITHDRAWN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECPE3256-10 RETAIL 
 
64 
 
64 
 
64 
 
 
 
ECPE3287-10 CLOTHING 
TEXTILE 
52 
 
40 
 
40 
 
12 
 
 
ECPE3850-10 PAPERS AND 
PRINTING 
WITHDRAWN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECPE4094-10 SAFETY AND 
SECURITY 
IN PROGRESS 
 
26 
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CASE SECTOR AFFECTED 
EMPLOYEES 
TOTAL 
RETRENCHED 
VOLUTARY JOBS 
SAVED 
ECPE4582-10 CLOTHING 
AND TEXTILE 
36 
 
30 
 
30 
 
6 
 
 
ECPE4953-10 CLOTHING 
AND TEXTILE 
48 
 
41 
 
24 
 
7 
 
 
ECPE5289-10 PRIVATE AND 
SECURITY 
51 
 
7 
 
7 44 
 
 
ECPE5326-10 BUSINESS 
 
IN PROGRESS 
 
 
 
  
 
 
ECPE5345-10 CHEMICAL 
 
WITHDRWAN 
 
 
 
  
 
 
ECPE5517-10 BUSINESS IN PROGRESS    
 
 
 
 
    840 
 
TOTAL 
JOBS 
SAVED 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1  LESSONS THAT EMPLOYERS AND UNIONS CAN LEARN FROM RECENT 
CASE LAW 
 
In the last few years an array of case law has emerged and employers and unions have to 
ensure that when embarking on a large scale retrenchment, there exists a good rationale for 
retrenching employees and that the proper procedure has been followed in terms of section 
189A. 
 
Embarking on a large scale retrenchment can be tricky and therefore the following lessons can 
be learnt from the courts: 
 
6.2 SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS 
 
As previously mentioned, substantive fairness relates to the reason for the retrenchment and 
when employees‟ are retrenched, there has to be a valid reason therefore.  The onus of proof 
in retrenchment matters rests on the employer and the court can investigate to see whether the 
real reason for the dismissal is something other than operational requirements. 
 
In FAWU obo Kapesi & Others v Premier Foods Ltd t/a Blue Ribbon Salt River
116
 concerned 
the dismissal of 32 employees pursuant to strike action, which took place on the employer‟s 
premises. Initially employees were served with letters of suspension relating to misconduct 
committed during the course of the strike.  Disciplinary hearings were to be held against these 
employees, but due to the disappearance of key witnesses the employer decided to abandon 
disciplinary action and instead it embarked on a retrenchment process.  The employer took the 
view that criminal violence posed a threat to the running of its business and was thus forced to 
retrench.  The court concluded that the employer could have held disciplinary hearings, even 
if witnesses were too scared to testify.  There are instances when hearsay evidence is 
admissible and it would have been in the interest of justice to do so.  
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In the abovementioned case, it was evident that the real reason for the dismissal was 
misconduct and not financial.  The employer in this instance could not circumvent the 
misconduct route by resorting to the operational reasons. 
 
There is authority for the proposition that an employer may resort to dismissals based on 
operational reasons, where the misconduct is related to operational requirement such as 
pilferage.
117
 
 
Employers should note that the ultimate reason for the dismissal should be the economic 
viability of the business.  Misconduct may trigger the economic rationale, in instances of 
shrinkage, but the duty rests on the employer to prove that the two reasons are interrelated.
118
 
 
Employers cannot dismiss for operational requirements when the real reason for the dismissal 
is poor work performance. It cannot disguise the poor work performance by restructuring.
119
 
 
If an employee is unable to work due to incapacity, then a procedure similar to that of 
retrenchment may be used by the employer, if the employee‟s inability will lead to significant 
losses for the employer.
120
  The employer must however investigate the circumstances 
relating to the incapacity and cannot simply embark on a section 189 process 
 
Employers should also note that it is unfair to select employees for retrenchment because he 
or she earns more than others, particularly since this will affect the longer serving employees. 
 
Employer should be aware of job security, as where there was a commitment to job security 
the courts will scrutinize the retrenchment closely and may require stricter compliance with 
the statutory compliance with severance pay.
121
 
 
Employers should also be aware of instances where employees are unable to meet sales 
targets and ensure that consultations are held with regard to any envisaged retrenchment as a 
result of not meeting sales targets.  The effect of not meeting targets meant that the business 
                                                 
117
  SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union & Others v Pep Stores (1998) 19 ILJ 1226 (LC). 
118
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119
  SA Mutual Life Assurance Society v Insurance and Banking Staff Association & Others [2001] 9 BLLR 
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120
  Ndevu v Scott Bader (Pty) Ltd 2010 1 BALR 91 (CCMA). 
121
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could not generate enough income to offset its costs including the salary.  Discussions must 
ensue with regard to the possibility and effect must be given to section 189(3).  True 
meaningful consultation must still take place.
122
 
 
Employers should always consider measures to avoid retrenchment and negotiate with an 
open mind.  The entire process should be bona fide.  In Maritz v Calibre Clinical Consultants 
(Pty) Ltd & Another,
123
 the court found that even though there was an economic rationale to 
retrench as the fraud unit was closing, the company went to lengths in concealing the fact that 
it would be providing fraud investigative services through another company.  The court 
further concluded that an employer who comes to court cannot argue that the dismissal was 
substantively and procedurally fair when in fact it did not consider alternatives or measures to 
avoid retrenchments.  
 
6.3 LESSONS LEARNT WITH REGARD TO PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
 
Employers and unions alike should note that the procedure relating to section 189A 
retrenchments may be challenged by an application to the Labour Court for an order in the 
following terms: 
 
(a) Compelling compliance with fair procedure 
(b) Interdicting dismissals prior to compliance with fair procedure 
(c) Directing reinstatement pending compliance with a fair procedure 
(d) Alternative relief in the form of compensation. 
 
Unions and employers should remember the following when embarking on section 189A 
retrenchments:
124
 
 
(a) Where a facilitator has been involved, parties must continue for at least 60 days, unless 
an agreement is reached before the elapse of 60 days. 
 
                                                 
122
  Solidarity obo Smith v Silvermoon t/a No Four SA (Pty) Ltd 2010 3 BALR. 
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  (2010) 31 ILJ 1436 (LC). 
124
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(b) If no facilitator is appointed, 30 days must elapse, if not agreement is reached a interest 
dispute is declared which must be referred to the CCMA , only after the expiry of the 
second 30 day period or after  a certificate of non-resolution has been issued, can an 
employer issue a retrenchment notice. 
 
(c) Compliance with these provisions of section 189A is peremptory. 
 
(d) If an employer implements large scale retrenchments over a long period of time, it may 
become necessary to issue a fresh section 189(3) notice if the numbers and the time 
frame initially anticipated is exceeded. 
 
(e) Unions must not delay in bringing applications in terms of section 189A(13) and do so 
timeously or risk that the court will not order reinstatement. 
 
(f) The courts are furthermore likely to apply a remedy that has a prospect of saving jobs. 
 
6.4 FINAL VIEWS 
 
Section 189A operates together with section 189 and provides the procedure when effecting 
large scale retrenchments.  The process is aimed at consultation and facilitation. A neutral 
trained third party, appointed by the CCMA assists in facilitating an agreement whereby 
employees and employers, reach consensus in relation to the entire retrenchment process.  
This agreement is reduced to writing and is binding on all parties thereto.  
 
In the Eastern Cape Region of the CCMA, the following statistics for 2010
125
 were available 
in relation to the Port Elizabeth office and East London office:  
 
a) Port Elizabeth office: jobs saved  amounted to 859 
b) East London office: jobs saved amounted to 516 
 
Often the terms of the agreement may be viewed as a favourable to employees as it often 
includes a preferential re-employment clause, training and assistance with regard to 
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placement.  The statutory severance pay is also a subject of discussion and very often unions 
negotiate far higher severance pay, which serves to lessen the blow of retrenchment. 
 
Another positive aspect of section 189A is that the section is aimed at large scale 
retrenchments and would thus relieve the smaller business from the burden imposed by the 
lengthy consultation process.  The large scale retrenchment exercise is a costly endeavor 
which has serious consequences if the provisions of the section are not followed.  Much 
litigation has come about as a result of uncertainty in implementing the provisions of section 
189A and therefore employer representatives are warned to adhere to the standard set by the 
Labour Court in regard to substantive and procedural fairness.  Seemingly it is much harder to 
dismiss employees based on operational reasons.  This may be viewed in a positive light 
especially in a country where unemployment is a critical issue for government.  
 
The negative aspect of section 189A is that the consultation process is very rigid and many 
investors may seem hesitant to invest in a country where its labour laws are rigid, and lacks 
flexibility.  Perhaps in time to come, government will find a way to deal with this and find the 
perfect medium, ensuring job security and furthermore increasing investor potential.  It is thus 
my recommendation that all relevant role players perhaps relook section 189A and consider in 
line with relevant case law the impact this section has on the employer and employees. 
 
Section 189A(13) regulates any procedural irregularity which must be challenged in the 
Labour Court.  Unions could approach the Labour court in this regard for a quick and 
accessible court process. The enactment of this limits strike action for procedural defects.  
The underlying decision to retrench is a subject for power play or adjudication, thus South 
African unions are given flexibility in engaging.  By enacting section 189A the legislator 
ensured that effective engagement occurred in large scale retrenchments.  Given the economic 
global crisis, where many businesses were facing the reality of retrenchment, facilitators who 
were involved in these large scale retrenchments assisted in saving jobs.  According to 
CCMA statistics, 14 430 jobs were saved in 2010.
126
  The CCMA through facilitation in large 
scale retrenchment plays a central role in delivering social justice through its cost effective 
and speedy dispute resolution process.  Given South Africa‟s rate of unemployment the 
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enactment of section 189A certainly has assisted in providing employees with a certain 
amount of protection. 
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